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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14

CSV
Lesson
The integrated approach to disaster recovery operations beyond infrastructure restoration to also include activities directed at restoring livelihood and improving the resilience of infrastructure and economic activity to disasters.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Enhance transparency for effective oversight. The government-established ERRA Council, headed by the prime minister, consists of independent and reputable individuals from civil society in the affected regions. The council followed the reconstruction process and reviewed and reported regularly to the general public on its progress and outcomes, developing a sense of ownership. Independent oversight, involving representatives of civil society disseminating information to key constituents, promoted transparency and enhanced the credibility of the host government.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Articulate policies, strategy, and standards early. The local populations and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) started reconstruction work well before provincial and federal governments started articulating their responses. Expectations rose, and some facilities, especially in health, were built by bilateral donors to standards that were much higher than the capacity of the line agencies to maintain them. This resulted in inconsistencies, violations of policies and standards developed for reconstruction work, and unsustainable operation of completed facilities.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Clarify roles and respect existing mandates. Initial delays in implementation of the project were caused by confusion about the roles of new and existing institutions. Any large- scale reconstruction operation requires clear delineation of the mandates of levels of government, to provide the structure and clarity required for all stakeholders to work with maximum efficiency. To the extent possible, the provincial and regional governments and federal agencies should be provided with capacity to perform their mandated roles.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Have a dedicated lead institution. The dedicated federal (Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority or ERRA) and provincial reconstruction authorities led the overall coordination and monitoring, and facilitated procedures, policies, and strategies for reconstruction. This arrangement allowed efficient and transparent reconstruction, and established the government's commitment to and credibility in mobilizing resources.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Institutionalize - fast-tracking - and flexibility. The technical assistance (TA) attached to the project allowed flexible responses to diverse capacity gaps, and fast-tracked procurement and disbursement, and the implementation of the safeguards policy. The flexibilities allowed under the emergency policy reduced procurement time and enabled efficient mobilization of resources.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
The sequence of reforms in the policy matrix was such that all substantial results could be achieved only after the completion of second tranche actions. In addition, liberal assessment of compliance allowed the release of the first tranche without achieving much toward sustainable outputs. More result-oriented sequencing of policy actions for the first tranche could have achieved some sustainable improvements in social service delivery.

Project Number: 37218-013
Project Name: Balochistan Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
Lesson
Given provincial and district capacity limitations, a Program focusing on a single sector would have had a better chance of success. Sustained support in one sector can be less demanding for both the government and ADB. Multi-sector policy reform interventions involving governance reform are difficult to manage, and a new system of local political governance imposed by the federal government added further complications.

Project Number: 37218-013
Project Name: Balochistan Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
Lesson
Capacity in the executing and implementing agencies was expected to be built through the accompanying TA loan. Program outputs like developing sector strategies, implementing expenditure tracking and service delivery surveys, training communities to manage and monitor social service delivery, and other outputs critical to achieving Program outcome depended on effective technical assistance (TA) loan administration. However, executing agency capacity to administer the TA loan was inadequate.

Project Number: 37218-013
Project Name: Balochistan Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
Lesson
The focus of the EA and PSU was on implementation of the policy matrix. Considerably less importance was given to the loan covenants. The PSU indicated that it would have recruited local support groups if it had been a condition in the policy matrix; however, since it was not a tranche condition, the PSU did not feel compelled to comply. This was also the case with covenants related to social sector expenditures and conditional grants, which were key covenants for ensuring improved social sector performance.

Project Number: 32264-013
Project Name: Punjab Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
Lesson
The implementation efficiency of the program was constrained by the late recruitment of the Technical Assistance Management Agency (TAMA), and the lack of recruitment of local support groups. The TAMA was meant to mobilize about 4,000 person-months of consulting services. The local support groups were expected to be mobilized in each district for 3 years to enhance capacity. For the majority of program implementation, these tasks became the responsibility of ADB and the program support unit (PSU), albeit with insufficient resources, which negatively affected implementation efficiency.

Project Number: 32264-013
Project Name: Punjab Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
Lesson
The risk assessment of political resistance to devolution was not sufficiently robust, and mitigating measures were not realistic. The design should have been revised to address political resistance to implementation of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 2001 (PLGO). Failure to do so undermined program implementation. Another significant design flaw was the multi-sector and ambitious scope of the program. This observation was also raised by the executing agency (EA) during the program completion review mission.

Project Number: 32264-013
Project Name: Punjab Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
Lesson
Need for steps to be taken at an early stage to keep the TA on track, and ensure that it is being managed according to the objectives of the loan program that it is supporting. IED’s 2005 SAPE for Social Sectors in Pakistan in fact had anticipated these based on the issues that it identified from the then implementation of SDSSP.

Project Number: 34337-033
Project Name: Sindh Devolved Social Services Project [Loan 2049-PAK]
Report Date:
Lesson
No new lessons

Project Number: 34337-013
Project Name: Sindh Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
CSV