Search

Displaying 91 - 101 of 101

Lesson
Design simpler and realistic projects. Emergency assistance projects, especially post-conflict ones, need to be designed in a way that the outputs can be achieved expeditiously. This requires simpler and more realistic designs. The design of Phase 1 could be seen as complex since it covered three different sectors. Yet given the need for immediate restoration, this could be rationalized as appropriate. Phase 2 was relatively simple and focused on roads only. However, Phase 1 covered the entire country, resulting in high transaction costs.

Project Number: XXXXX
Project Name: Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, Phases 1 and 2
Report Date:
Lesson
Design realistic projects with balanced expectations. Post-conflict rehabilitation is a complex process covering all sectors simultaneously. Although there are good intentions to fit in lot of different components in a project due to its emergency nature, the implementation has been found to be difficult—time and resource-intense.

Project Number: XXXXX
Project Name: Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, Phases 1 and 2
Report Date:
Lesson
Prioritize the areas of interventions. In a post-conflict context, it is important to prioritize the areas of intervention so that funds are used judiciously. For Phase 1, the areas of interventions were appropriate—roads, power, and port. These are high-priority areas, and the joint assessment mission correctly chose these sectors for funding through the TFET.

Project Number: XXXXX
Project Name: Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, Phases 1 and 2
Report Date:
Lesson
Frequent and closer monitoring of project implementation. Both Phase 1 and Phase 2 showed that early and frequent supervision by ADB is crucial to ensuring efficient project implementation. In a post-conflict situation, the government lacks adequate resources, and ADB’s value addition in this area could deliver better results. Para. 126 shows that despite frequent review missions there remained areas for improvement in ADB’s supervision of the project.

Project Number: XXXXX
Project Name: Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, Phases 1 and 2
Report Date:
Lesson
Village management committees for power sector. The experience of Phase 1 shows that the VMCs were not effective in maintaining and operating the power plants because (i) they did not have sufficient ability to ensure consistent collections, (ii) they did not have sufficient revenues to pay for the fuel to operate the diesel generator sets, and (iii) they lacked the technical expertise to operate and maintain these sets. The TFET water sector projects had similar conclusions, indicating that this structure needs to be improved.

Project Number: XXXXX
Project Name: Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, Phases 1 and 2
Report Date:
Lesson
Insufficient analytical underpinnings led to formal rather than substantive compliance with tranche release conditions. Joint undertakings with other donors and RGoB might have strengthened the substantive analysis of policies and the robustness of the dialogue with RGoB. 60 For example, requiring that RGoB formulate an FDI policy, without engaging substantively on the substance of that policy, was not useful. A policy was written and adopted, but a new attempt was being made to formulate a workable policy in 2009.

Project Number: 29243/29243-01/31908
Project Name: Financial Sector Intermediation Facility and Equity Investment in Bhutan National Bank
Report Date:
Lesson
Delays in the establishment of a credit information bureau was also partly a failure of analysis. Costs were underestimated and the problems were not fully understood. Founding a CIB in Bhutan is not only a problem of coordination among the lending institutions. The challenge is more fundamental, with the essential problem being the poor data systems and practices of the lending institutions. Substantive analysis at the design stage of the FSIF would probably have identified this issue and allowed ADB and RGoB to address it earlier.

Project Number: 29243/29243-01/31909
Project Name: Financial Sector Intermediation Facility and Equity Investment in Bhutan National Bank
Report Date:
Lesson
The failure of interest rate liberalization was also partly a failure of analysis. Removing overt administrative control of interest rates may make little difference to prevailing rates and practices if there is little competition between lenders because of the sector’s oligopolistic and closely held structure. Several factors made it unlikely that simple deregulation of rate setting would be conclusive.

Project Number: 29243/29243-01/31910
Project Name: Financial Sector Intermediation Facility and Equity Investment in Bhutan National Bank
Report Date:
Lesson
The key problems and constraints of SME access to credit in Bhutan needed to be better understood. Problems included high interest rates, short loan amortization periods, and excessive collateral requirements. The FSIF loan had no effect on these.

Project Number: 29243/29243-01/31911
Project Name: Financial Sector Intermediation Facility and Equity Investment in Bhutan National Bank
Report Date:
Lesson
A small equity investment can have a large impact in the right circumstances, especially if it is supported by TA and policy reforms. Although ADB’s equity investment in BNB was largely effective in achieving its aims, it illustrates that small investments are not easy for ADB to handle within its cost structure.

Project Number: 29243/29243-01/31912
Project Name: Financial Sector Intermediation Facility and Equity Investment in Bhutan National Bank
Report Date:
Lesson
Another lesson is that if ADB brings a private partner into the deal with the aim of facilitating capacity development, it should only go with a strategic investor with relevant banking experience, who will remain as a shareholder for a long time and thus play an active role in the management and corporate governance of an institution. In this particular case, the investor was not actively involved in managing the institution and acted more like a financial than a strategic investor.

Project Number: 29243/29243-01/31913
Project Name: Financial Sector Intermediation Facility and Equity Investment in Bhutan National Bank
Report Date: