Search

Displaying 16 - 30 of 30

Lesson
A multiple tranche design or program cluster design is useful, as it brings more balance to the program and helps keep up the government's commitment, even though such a design has high transaction costs for the government and ADB. Such designs also discourage the tendency for the government and ADB to include easier actions in the initial tranche and tougher ones in the later tranches, thereby unbalancing the program and leading to less than successful ratings. The incentive tranche kept ADB and the government engaged and kept the reforms on track.

Project Number: 44061-012
Project Name: Strengthening Public Resource Management Program
Report Date:
Lesson
In countries with capacity challenges, reforms take time as limited capacity results in implementation delays. This must be accounted for in design.

Project Number: 44061-012
Project Name: Strengthening Public Resource Management Program
Report Date:
Lesson
Where country systems are weak, program monitoring could benefit from TA (technical assistance), as in Tajikistan. The TA could focus on expenditure tracking mechanisms, internal controls, and external audits; and be conducted in two stages. In the first stage, when monitoring capacity is still weak, experts could be engaged to monitor program-supported expenditures rather than relying on the government to submit monitoring reports. The second stage would focus on improving country systems to help the transition of monitoring tasks from external experts to government staff.

Project Number: 44061-012
Project Name: Strengthening Public Resource Management Program
Report Date:
Lesson
In order to have a meaningful and more sustainable impact, policy reforms should focus on areas in which ADB has been engaged and remains involved over a longer time period.

Project Number: 44061-012
Project Name: Strengthening Public Resource Management Program
Report Date:
Lesson
No additional lesson.

Project Number: 39516-023, 39516-013
Project Name: Local Government Financing and Budget Reform Program Cluster
Report Date:
Lesson
The integrated approach to disaster recovery operations beyond infrastructure restoration to also include activities directed at restoring livelihood and improving the resilience of infrastructure and economic activity to disasters.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Local government reform is a complex undertaking, involving major changes in the regulatory framework, institutional arrangements, supporting infrastructure, and human capacity. It also requires a long-term perspective in both design and implementation. Thus, the government?s continuous commitment to reform, its ownership of the program, and collaborative support by the donor community are all necessary elements in designing local government reform through a programmatic approach.

Project Number: 39516-013, 39516-023
Project Name: Local Government Financing and Budget Reform Program Cluster
Report Date:
Lesson
Enhance transparency for effective oversight. The government-established ERRA Council, headed by the prime minister, consists of independent and reputable individuals from civil society in the affected regions. The council followed the reconstruction process and reviewed and reported regularly to the general public on its progress and outcomes, developing a sense of ownership. Independent oversight, involving representatives of civil society disseminating information to key constituents, promoted transparency and enhanced the credibility of the host government.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Articulate policies, strategy, and standards early. The local populations and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) started reconstruction work well before provincial and federal governments started articulating their responses. Expectations rose, and some facilities, especially in health, were built by bilateral donors to standards that were much higher than the capacity of the line agencies to maintain them. This resulted in inconsistencies, violations of policies and standards developed for reconstruction work, and unsustainable operation of completed facilities.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Clarify roles and respect existing mandates. Initial delays in implementation of the project were caused by confusion about the roles of new and existing institutions. Any large- scale reconstruction operation requires clear delineation of the mandates of levels of government, to provide the structure and clarity required for all stakeholders to work with maximum efficiency. To the extent possible, the provincial and regional governments and federal agencies should be provided with capacity to perform their mandated roles.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Have a dedicated lead institution. The dedicated federal (Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority or ERRA) and provincial reconstruction authorities led the overall coordination and monitoring, and facilitated procedures, policies, and strategies for reconstruction. This arrangement allowed efficient and transparent reconstruction, and established the government's commitment to and credibility in mobilizing resources.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
Institutionalize - fast-tracking - and flexibility. The technical assistance (TA) attached to the project allowed flexible responses to diverse capacity gaps, and fast-tracked procurement and disbursement, and the implementation of the safeguards policy. The flexibilities allowed under the emergency policy reduced procurement time and enabled efficient mobilization of resources.

Project Number: 39631-013
Project Name: Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project
Report Date:
Lesson
The implementation efficiency of the program was constrained by the late recruitment of the Technical Assistance Management Agency (TAMA), and the lack of recruitment of local support groups. The TAMA was meant to mobilize about 4,000 person-months of consulting services. The local support groups were expected to be mobilized in each district for 3 years to enhance capacity. For the majority of program implementation, these tasks became the responsibility of ADB and the program support unit (PSU), albeit with insufficient resources, which negatively affected implementation efficiency.

Project Number: 32264-013
Project Name: Punjab Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
Lesson
The risk assessment of political resistance to devolution was not sufficiently robust, and mitigating measures were not realistic. The design should have been revised to address political resistance to implementation of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 2001 (PLGO). Failure to do so undermined program implementation. Another significant design flaw was the multi-sector and ambitious scope of the program. This observation was also raised by the executing agency (EA) during the program completion review mission.

Project Number: 32264-013
Project Name: Punjab Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date:
Lesson
The focus of the EA and PSU was on implementation of the policy matrix. Considerably less importance was given to the loan covenants. The PSU indicated that it would have recruited local support groups if it had been a condition in the policy matrix; however, since it was not a tranche condition, the PSU did not feel compelled to comply. This was also the case with covenants related to social sector expenditures and conditional grants, which were key covenants for ensuring improved social sector performance.

Project Number: 32264-013
Project Name: Punjab Devolved Social Services Program
Report Date: