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Lesson
The reconstruction grants of PRs175,000 per household offered by the government was for 400 square foot area. This was substantially lower than the prevailing rates for the desired standard of seismic-resilient construction. About 60% of the rebuilt houses were 500-999 square feet. A pre- and post-earthquake comparison (footnote 10) showed that the overall proportion of houses with less than 1,000 square feet had increased from 65% to 80%.

Project Number: 40563-013
Project Name: Earthquake-Displaced People Livelihood Restoration Program
Report Date:
Lesson
A major effort went into training compliance teams and developing compliance manuals used for spotted and reported noncompliance among the home owners. Employing a third party to monitor compliance directly at the household level may be the best way to get a comprehensive picture of the problems involved in the adaptation of seismic standards. Perhaps a greater focus on the ability of the compliance teams to provide on-the-spot solutions to home owners may also have yielded better results.

Project Number: 40563-013
Project Name: Earthquake-Displaced People Livelihood Restoration Program
Report Date:
Lesson
Reconstruction led by communities can be expedited if house design options take into account the local skills, materials, tastes, geography, and culture. Also, innovative money-saving building techniques need local acceptance to be sustainable, but this may require more time and effort devoted to training.

Project Number: 40563-013
Project Name: Earthquake-Displaced People Livelihood Restoration Program
Report Date:
Lesson
Community involvement in owner-driven rehabilitation and reconstruction programs - through training, inspection responsibilities, and village committees - provides the human resources needed for major post-disaster housing reconstruction efforts. It also creates a greater sense of ownership, helps build capacity, reduce disputes and ensures the sustained use of seismic reconstruction techniques in the long term.

Project Number: 40563-013
Project Name: Earthquake-Displaced People Livelihood Restoration Program
Report Date:
Lesson
In situ housing reconstruction prevents disputes and increases efficiency, but it does not allow for improvements in historic patterns of rural, village, or town development; nor does it make possible the consolidation of housing sites and services. There is thus a trade-off between efficiency and overall effectiveness. On the other hand, outsourced reconstruction that allows household relocation by a third party may be more effective, but much less efficient and sustainable.

Project Number: 40563-013
Project Name: Earthquake-Displaced People Livelihood Restoration Program
Report Date:
Lesson
The owner-driven, in situ approach to post-disaster housing reconstruction is efficient, but only partially effective in achieving the desired outcomes. This is mainly because ensuring uniformity in construction quality and seismic standards is a major challenge when serving large populations, irrespective of the levels of awareness and training of the home owners. This challenge can be partly addressed if there is real-time impact and outcome monitoring, as well as an efficient feedback-and-response loop during the reconstruction.

Project Number: 40563-013
Project Name: Earthquake-Displaced People Livelihood Restoration Program
Report Date:
Lesson
Where a large capacity-building component precedes project preparation, reviews by ADB should be more frequent. The consultants should also produce verifiable and detailed reports on progress and staff training. This will allow a more timely response to problems by both ADB and the Borrower.

Project Number: 38458-013
Project Name: Infrastructure Development
Report Date:
Lesson
When projects cross ministerial boundaries�as was the case with the national and provincial stakeholders in the water resources sector�there must be a clear commitment at the design stage to avoid disputes. Otherwise, such projects should be avoided altogether.

Project Number: 38458-013
Project Name: Infrastructure Development
Report Date:
Lesson
While the project-preparation facilities made sense, the TA loan itself was spread too thinly. The funds were dispersed across three sectors, and were handled by numerous agencies managing subprojects in many locations. This made coordination a challenge right from the outset, especially given the absence of an experienced and capable local coordination team. It did not work. In retrospect, the multi-sector design of the TA was wrong, and approval should not be given for similar TA loans in the future. The important lesson learned here is to restrict loans to one sector at a time.

Project Number: 38458-013
Project Name: Infrastructure Development
Report Date:
Lesson
ADB should have restructured its technical assistance (TA) loan much earlier, taking into account two events: (i) the approval of new multitranche financing facilities (MFFs) with project-preparation components that duplicated some of the TA's work, and (ii) dramatic changes in the economy that made some subprojects irrelevant and/or unfundable. The review missions reported on consultant services and their performance, and they did propose a major restructuring of the TA over time.

Project Number: 38458-013
Project Name: Infrastructure Development
Report Date:
Lesson
The Planning and Development Division's (PDD lack of capacity to assist the implementing agencies delayed the issuance of consultant mandates, thus slowing down work on some priority subprojects. The choice of the PDD as the executing agency was a mistake. The PDD lacked qualified staff,, access, and a track record. The setting up of new units to manage consultancy contracts does not work and should not have been proposed in the first place.

Project Number: 38458-013
Project Name: Infrastructure Development
Report Date:
Lesson
Given the weak capacity of the executing and implementing agencies, consultants should have been recruited before loan effectiveness. Had the consulting services been available, the project would most likely have achieved at least some of its objectives.

Project Number: 36654-013
Project Name: Restructuring of the Technical Education and Vocational Training System Project (Balochistan)
Report Date:
Lesson
Frequent changes in project administration at ADB caused confusion and had a negative effect on project implementation. During the project, administration moved from the South Asia Department to the Central and West Asia Department, and from the Social Sector Division, via the Governance and Finance Division, to the Pakistan Resident Mission.

Project Number: 36654-013
Project Name: Restructuring of the Technical Education and Vocational Training System Project (Balochistan)
Report Date:
Lesson
Weak capacity of project staff results in procedural lapses, possible violations of the loan agreement, and slow implementation. Moreover, stringent internal audit controls and close monitoring of expenditures bring more transparency in financial transactions.

Project Number: 36654-013
Project Name: Restructuring of the Technical Education and Vocational Training System Project (Balochistan)
Report Date:
Lesson
Inadequate review by ADB of the Planning Commission form 1 (PC-1) and inconsistencies between the PC-1 and the report and recommendation of the President (RRP) slow down project implementation. To ensure a thorough review of the PC-1 by ADB, the project officer should be required to prepare a comparative statement identifying both the similarities and differences between the PC-1 and the RRP and loan agreement, and the Planning and Development Department (PDD) should be advised on corrective measures before the loan is declared effective.

Project Number: 36654-013
Project Name: Restructuring of the Technical Education and Vocational Training System Project (Balochistan)
Report Date: